Jump to content
Sign in to follow this  
Rocy7

Construction of fleet background?

Recommended Posts

To encourage players to familiarize themselves with the system I'm writing a series of texts about the universe.

Now I try to describe the rules of creating the fleet, but I find lack the background, a some justification for the need to take into the fleet all particular classes of ships.

Are you ever wondered on this issue? Why fleet can not consist of only frigates, or only cruisers ? Why we have to be fulfilled specific requirements to create a fleet? Of course, the universe Firestorm fleet of just a tier I would be inefficient, but what is the background justification for such a solution?

I see it:

Large Capital ships - only those ships have sufficient space for the "unnecessary" equipment as transmitters for subspace communication with headquarters or central coordination of communication activities of the fleet. It is a kind of nerve center of the activities of the fleet, to provide adequate conditions for the work of the admiral and his staff. More space is  sturdier hull gives better protection fleet commander. The commander located on the frigate could die even from one accidentally hit an enemy destroyer, which negatively affect the coordination of the activities of the fleet.

Medium Capital ships - if capital ships we consider the nervous system of the fleet, the medium can be described as muscles. They provide a good balance of durability and frepower at a lower cost which makes this class the most common on the battlefield. Armoured worse than tier I, the ships do not need have "unnecessary" equipment, which allows them not only to better speed, but above all reduces the cost of the war.

Small ships - sometimes on the battlefield important is the speed, whether it is for the use of loopholes in the defense of the enemy and attacking him from the flank, or in securing their own backs. Developed for these tasks frigates and corvettes. Featuring too weak weapons to threaten one bigger ships, specialized in the wolf pack tactics, relying more on the agility and speed rather than armor. An important role of these ships is scouting, especially in places inaccessible to larger ships as asteroid field or gas nebula.

 

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Just now, Rocy7 said:

The classed as Medium Capital.

Right, so they are Capital Ships.  Ships that are usually Tier I are Large Capitals.

Capital designation is usually dependant on the universe.  In the Honorverse, Capital designations are reserved for Ships of the Wall, Battleships on up.  In the old X-Wing games, a Corvette is a Capital ship.

In FSA, Capitals are designated in the Medium size on up, so reserving it to Battlecruisers on up can be confusing for new readers.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

I've broken this into parts, so that you guys can get through it. I'll leave notes in brackets for what I mean and short notes on the subject.

Again, this could be long, really long, So don't try to get through this in one sitting.

Part 1 -

Doctrine, what is it?

What we're talking about here is doctrine. Doctrine is a funny thing because it shapes the force on a physical level, as well as a psychological level. It determines how it fights, thinks, breaths. It supplies itself and it reacts to a threat. The very ships that it builds are predefined by the assumptions of this doctrine.

 

Part 2 - 

Assumptions

I have to make a number of assumptions on the scope, speed and nature of combat presented in the greater Firestorm universe.

1. All engagements are fought on an intra-system basis. That is the relative area of operations, engagements are quite small in the greater scope of the universe.

 

2. All ships are in constant motion. Depending on the frame of reference, even to remain in stationary, it would have to move due to the rotation of the planets around the central stellar mass of the system. (Be it of a singular, binary, trinary system). Not only that, the solar system is in orbit of a galactic centre, which is in motion next to the other galaxies around it.

Ships may be in orbit of a set point or object (planet, moon, sun itself, again, moving). Depending on the frame of reference, the speeds become very interesting. All quite ridiculous without understanding the exact frame of reference.

 

3. Due to the nature of Fold Space Drive technology, engagements are possible across a variety of environments. Namely that they are still able to blunder into each other. This means that engagements can be fought at any time.

Also that there are occasions and limits to this ability to use this drive. What this is and how it works is up in the air. Also, somewhat irreverent to the scope of this discussion and the assumptions made.

 

4. The interesting and powerful effects of relativistic effects are not present due to the low speeds of the engagements, relatively speaking to the speed of light, c.

 

5. The ships are able to freely move through a four dimensional space. Space time itself is four dimensional and this has definite implications towards targeting, range of engagement and range of motion.

ie, the need to defend against attack from above, below, as well as the fore, after, port and starboard.  

6. Ships are in fact, closed, sealed environments when they are deployed. This means that they are highly vulnerable to attacks of a viral, biological nature. Closed environments also mean that they are highly resistant to such attacks as well.

Also note that this means that any systems that support, manage this need to be isolated and prevented from being accessed from outside, hostile forces.

 

7. Equivalent weight classes are not equivalent in role. Nor are roles equivalent across classes either. Doctrine leads to implications in what does what role. How you fight and how you build are tied quite closely together. Where as one where you work on a level of carriers and strike craft, larger capital ships will be defensive. Those who favour guns will also have similar defensive roles for their capital ships, cruisers. However they will also be able to act offensively.

 

8. In addition to the above, the core tenet of naval warfare is that to engage the enemy, you need to find the enemy. This is true of the greater Firestorm universe, though the sensors may be tracking things other than electro-magnetic radiation, the principle is that you need to find them first. Not being seen is also of import.

 

9. Ships are deployed in close to the numbers they are shown in the books for a valid, tactical reason in the doctrine. Therefore, I have to assume that battlegroups are in fact, made of smaller units and subunits. This means that fleets, naval divisions and other groupings are in the hundreds to thousands of units, vessels. This include units for rotation, reserves and the logistic chain to support that force. These would also include merchant vessels, tenders, refuellers and the like.

Direct combat forces may only be limited to a few dozen vessels, however should a general call to action sound, hundreds of vessels, in theory, could respond.

 

10. Ships have a finite internal volume. Once you start to fill this with crew, life support, engines, armour, storage for food, fuel, water or water purification, you can run out very quickly. It's less about the size of the vessel than you would think, but the clarity of purpose for that vessel.

 

Part 3 - 

Terms, concepts and acronyms.

Yes, we need this, as I may use these. I will try not to, but if I do, these should cover them.

 

CIWS - Close In Weapon Systems, short ranged defensive weapon arrays, including items like the Phalanx system and the Rolling Airframe Missile.

C3 - Command, Control and Communications

ECM - Electronic Counter Measures

ECCM - Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures

Flag - The ship that carries the admiral, task force commander.

Firepower kill - the direct destruction of an enemy vessel due to the sheer amount of firepower directed at it. To reduce it to something that is no longer able to fight in any form.

Hard Kill - Defensive measures which are designed to directly destroy the incoming hostile threat.

Logistics - The act of moving, supplying and cataloguing materiel for the use of a naval force.

Manoeuvre Kill/Mobility Kill - The act of killing a ship by denying its ability to effectively steer.

Materiel - The specific materials that are needed to keep a vessel in fighting shape and to be operational.

Soft Kill - Defensive measures which are not designed to directly destroy the incoming hostile threat.

 

Part 4 - 

Practical elements of doctrine

Here's the biggest section of this and perhaps the most complex. The simple fact is that you can consider doctrine your foundation. It determines the values you place on many different factors. Not only that, it also determines function and effectiveness. It defines the thinking of those serve and how they react to scenarios. It also keeps vulnerabilities in the system, as the greatest weakness of any doctrine, is the human beings who need to follow it. It's not just the crew of the vessel, the people who build it, design it and interact with it on a materiel level.

The first part of this is to identify the needs of your force. It seems simple, but this is not the case. If you're going to have secondary and tertiary responsibilities, then you must make sacrifices from the primary role. While you may argue, combat is combat. That is not the case, low intensity engagements like those to deal with raiders and pirates would not compare to the stresses that direct front line combat have. The first is in the assumptions and nature of the enemy. The second is that the endurance of a vessel now becomes important. There's no point staying on station for six weeks when you need months. This can be overcome with rotations or fleet tenders, but this is very much a work around rather than a solution.

Secondly, doctrine defines your reaction to an event and it also determines your thought patterns. If you're a reactive force, you need an event to respond to. It means that your management of ships, crew and materiel is now that much more complex. You will need to rotate through Immediate Response (under 24 hours underway), Fast Response (up to one week) and Slow (fortnight to month). You may also have a Rest unit, so as to keep morale and psychological health at high levels. Combat effectiveness is hard to get and hard to maintain.

Thirdly, doctrine unfortunately has one great weakness and that weakness is itself. The more you think, define and label, the more holes you can create. While you can develop systems, allow freedom of operation or in the chain of command (please see the US Coast Guard reaction to Katrina, as the boat's skipper has ultimate field command, as opposed to the other agencies who had chains of command to authorise assistance). The more you restrict the freedom of operation the more you need doctrine to cover these holes.

Breaking it down into the specifics into the areas, you have three categories. Construction, Training and Fighting. We'll start in order, with Construction. Building a warship isn't as easy as plans get authorised, sent out to a shipyard and then built. All ships answer a need in a force. This need is determined by how the force fights. Self referential, absolutely. Also true.

Consider you're authorising a new vessel for a fleet. If you're operating a force built around large calibre gunnery, then you would have a different set of needs and functionality for this vessel as to a carrier or missile/torpedo based force. By this, I am referring to the specific, primary method of munition delivery.

In this example, if we assume a new frigate is being ordered, then you have different needs. For those which are facing heavy, large calibre weapons, armour is a prime concern. Additionally, you might consider some hard kill defence systems to intercept enemy fire. For the others, CIWS systems would be. The same is true of some soft kill defence systems. This would assume the needed role is an escort.

If the role for this is for a vessel that can operate further from the lines, the concerns of storage imply that sacrifices have to be made to other areas. There are ways to work around this, degrees of automation, restriction of the use of weaponry or on engine output. They are still very much work arounds and not to be considered solutions. This is making the best of what you have, not making the best you can. Making the best you can is the goal, but to do so, you risk the unobtainable. There's only so much you can put into a ship.

Now, I want to talk about role because we have very different criteria here. If we wish to have this vessel scout for the enemy, you may choose to optimise the engine output and the sensor arrays, with ECM and ECCM arrays of larger size or power consumption. This would mean many of its defences in its protection onion, are in fact soft kill. If we design this vessel for lighter combat, convoy routes, your need for speed is less, which you can then spend on weaponry or sensors. Communication as well is another area you can spend part of your internal volume on.

To call back for a moment, all thoughts towards this need to keep in mind how you deliver your damage. If you can accept that those who favour a big gun would also have a carrier with strike elements for reconnaissance, as well as second line combat, you should be able to accept that ship design answers a very specific need. If your force lacks effective reconnaissance, you need to answer that need. That need you answer with a specific set of design goals and criteria. I would suggest that criteria is operational range (endurance), low sensor profile (ECM or design to reduce emissions) and speed (evasion, in the case of discovery).

Second, you have Training. At the end of the day, a force needs to have as simple as possible a process to allow them to operate a vessel. This process also needs to be secure to prevent people from subverting them for their own gain or actions not in the interest of the of the state, commanding force. This can be answered in a great deal of depth, but I don't believe it's needed here. What does need to be said is that we can assume these people are going to be competent and knowledgeable towards their preferred weapon systems and ship defensive systems. I also would suggest that sufficient time has passed for each major school of thought to have developed and trained sufficient officers for new officers to be qualified to operate effectively.

Now for the real hard section, Fighting. This could be a book unto itself in the examples you could give or the specifics you could discuss. I will try not to get too bogged down in them. This is already quite long. Weapon delivery is a challenge under the best of occasions, as I have assumed. What is also an issue is here is that how you deliver it and from the size of the platform involved changes its applications. Without getting too deep into specifics, larger platforms can carry larger ordinance or more ordinance with less sacrifices made, apart from those of the class. This endurance means it can operate longer. However, to stress, this would operating in isolation.

This means that any larger scale combat vessel would have its size being used against it. It would be a large target and the speed with which it can engage and disable, kill enemy targets may in fact, be quite fast. Even if it is fast, a larger number of targets can swarm this. This means units will not be unsupported. In squadrons being the first case, mutual support of multiple ship classes in the second.

Finally, before we discuss examples, it needs to be said that finding the enemy is as important as it was in the age of fighting sail. Just as difficult as well. This means that the idea of the battlegroup, which supporting elements to provide a zone of control are important. If you control the area around a vessel, you have time to analyse, identify and react to incoming contacts.

Example 1, Big Guns and lots of them

If your force is built around high impact ordinance, then you will value armour or mobility as your counter. Possibly both if the technology is available, not getting hit is of prime importance. There are different ways to achieve this, you might determine that you will use speed to close, to allow you to attack from angles you can't be fired on. If you go armour, you may have speed, but not the mobility, turning ability of lighter vessels, due to inertia.

You also have made sacrifices for the storage of the ammunition and the volume that needs to be given to the loading mechanism for these weapons. Longer term, this could mean ammunition may degrade due to the materials involved in construction or in volatile components within. This also means that if you wish to use additional weapons, such as torpedoes or strike craft, you can not carry as much as if this was your primary means of engagement.

The conclusion here is that your choice of delivery, gives you weaknesses. You may combine this with your primary strength to produce a number of different ship classes. Co-ordination between these assets is part of Training and is ultimately designed to cover other weaknesses. Smaller units working in conjunction with larger units simply makes sense.

Suggested Fleet composition -

Capital Vessel, Flag,

Capital vessel, single centre line gun or multiple offensive gun turrets, defensive systems. (The core of the battlegroups firepower).

Cruisers, multiple turrets and defensive  guns, faster speed than the capital vessel. (This allows supporting fire, as well as flanking operations).

Frigates or Corvettes, few low calibre dual purpose guns (can serve as close in escorts or long range scouts.)

Example 2, Strike Craft or Missiles

If we now assume that we are working as the opposing force to the Big Gun force previously used, then we would make very different assumptions. Namely, we do not want to engage our enemy on their terms. Our terms would be to have our ships in positions where they are out of the range or arc of effective fire from their primary guns. You can achieve this through missiles, either delivered by strike craft or by their own propulsion.

First of all, we can see that this focus has prevented us from developing big guns of our own. This is for two reasons, they have a time advantage and secondly, we do not seemingly have the officer specialists to support their operations.

If we agree this is true, then we would look to those features, skills we have in ample supply. Precision delivery of a large number of smaller missiles can be just as effective as a single, large projectile. If we understand that any CIWS system, in combination with other soft kill means can be overwhelmed, then it follows that you also have to make sacrifices for the storage capacity, systems and training to make the most of. This means that your internal volume is going to pre-assigned to certain items.

Again, to be clear, this is the trap of doctrine, where it defines the lines of thought.

 

Suggested Fleet Composition (Strike element)

Super carrier, Flag vessel

Cruisers, dual purpose, both offensive and defensive missiles, systems present.

Frigates, Corvettes, largely defensive armament, to provide information combat control to the strike elements, to ensure that they are effective in combat, damage units are withdrawn, munitions and reloads are assigned to targets of opportunity.  

 

Suggested Fleet Composition (Missile)

Dreadnaught, Flag vessel

Battleship or Heavy cruiser, missile arrays of an offensive nature, matched with defensive arrays to minimise return fire.

Cruisers, perimetre defence with secondary offensive arrays, again to provide defensive fire due to the interception of incoming hostile ordnance. (Trust me, it's hard to get a missile through a proper screen. It's really hard.)

Frigates, Corvettes, largely defensive armament, to provide information and terminal guidance (last moment target locks and information updates. Also two words together I just love.)

 

In the scope of these examples I have to point out that the Big Gun fleet is there and accepts that it would be hit in an engagement. Not only does it accept that, it counts on the fact it is able to hit so hard that return fire is inefficient at worst, non-existent at best. Compare to the attitude of the Strike elements or Missile fleet. They count on the ability to intercept and disable the incoming return fire. The attack has been launched the reprisal is able to launched before your own ordnance hits.

 

Part 5 - 

Practical examples of doctrine from the greater Firestorm universe.

These are some suggestions as to the possible doctrine core elements as used by the factions of the Firestorm universe. I want to stress probable, as without clear access to documents that simply do not exist, I can't make anything more solid that a best possible guess. This does not cover all of the factions and should be considered to be a starting point for any drafting to be done towards a definite, end document.

Terran Alliance -

Combined arms approach, favouring smaller groups of forces operating under independent chains of command. These units can work as much in support of the colonies, disaster relief, as they are an active military force. While extremely capable of effective military action, they are more than a pure military force.

I draw this conclusion from the nature of the Satellite Charter itself. I feel the implication is that these are colonies, entities, bodies that are working together and providing mutual support and aid. I want to note the mutual. I would also suggest the charter has a large merchant fleet.

 

Dindrenzi Federation -

The opposite of the Terran Federation. A purely military force focused on shorter term objectives and operations. I would suggest this military focus and offensive footing allows it to direct great power, but also, limits its scope of operations.

I suggest this as their ships have a great forward focus, but lack the coverage to defend from a flank attack. They also do not need mobility to turn, but would favour high speed. Once you hit and penetrate, you aim for depth of penetration (no kink, basic armoured warfare conclusion).

I would suggest the idea of federated states does not carry the same notion of mutual support and aid. I read this as a far more independent collection of states and bodies that work together for a mutual goal. This goal is shared, but the resources between the bodies aren't as shared as they are in the Terran Alliance.

 

Rense System Navy -

More akin to the Terran Alliance, as they work towards a far more paramilitary to law enforcement role. This role means they need elements of highly concealable units, as well as a higher degree of mobility over the standard Dindrenzi force.

I would stress the combination of traits (read MARs) and coverage, they are a front line unit. Their primary duty though isn't front line naval engagements. They are a police force with a very strict set of laws to enforce. One they enforce through the application and implication of force. Lots of force.

Here, I want to stress that kinetic weapons like torpedoes and railguns are more than capable, with the right engineering of massive planetary side destruction. Even at low values of c in terms of weapon velocity. You have non-nuclear ordinance exploding with the force of small nuclear devices, in the order of 3.5 to 6 kilotons.  

 

Directorate -

The Directorate is hard for me to describe. In part they don't have such a clear doctrine reading for me as the other factions I list here. What I do see is a force that is technologically driven and it's one that exists to gain resources for the Directorate. Cyberwarfare and its weapon arrays show that they consider combat as the acquisition of resources. Disable a ship and then break it down for the materials, information and materiel it contains.  

The short version, I would challenge is that the Directorate is a more defensive force than an offensive one. It's there to hold and secure Directorate assets. However, to do it with minimal financial risk to their own assets. This makes determining how they fight hard, as the main goal is seemingly the prevention of damage to their own vessels. It's a good goal, but the moment eliminating the opposition is secondary, you run into problems.

I also do not know how any sort of mutual support or disaster relief fits into their doctrine. Are they going to work to support their assets or do they write off, after a certain point? Those are better questions and questions I can't answer.

 

Works Raptor -

Works Raptor is a hard one to describe. You could describe them as the offensive wing of the Directorate. I don't believe this is entirely fair. The simple issue here is that they need to be as capable of defensive actions as offensive ones. I would suggest that the Directorate represents the common bulk of the force, while Works Raptor represents specific tactical groups.

They would be the point of the spear, if you will. One that is used to attack specific targets or engage in specific operations. They would have direct support from the Directorate in order to engage in them, but are at best a secondary partner and potentially a disposable one.

I would also stress, in the eyes of the state, any and all assets are expendable, if it works for the survival or advancement of the state. This time, the state being a large corporate entity.

 

OmniDyne -

OmniDyne represent a highly mobile, merchant fleet. Most of their smaller classes would be focused on the defence of the foundry ships. These would also have great defensive capabilities, at the cost of an inability to rapidly react to changes in operations. Even under take offensive operations.

They are mobile, yes, but they are not reactive. There's a difference, most importantly being that they are going to secure an area, mine it clear and move on. They do not need to hold territory as a tax base, resource site once it's been drained of supplies. Therefore, engines are a concern for them and an important part of their ship design.

 

Hawker Industries -

Please see the example I give of the early 20th century greater British Empire. Hawker Industries would have a number of scattered sites all over the galaxy and so would need to maintain a force around the core of these outposts. Further outposts would need to be able to rapidly responded to. Not only that, may also need a certain degree of light weight protection for their mass in order to maintain their speed. You can't change this fact, ships get big, lose speed.

This rapid response objective is shared with the Terran Alliance, though it's more difficult and harder to achieve in the case of Hawker Industries as opposed to the Alliance and the core worlds of the Charter.

 

Part 6 - 

Conclusion

Drawing the idea of doctrine from short sentences and anecdotes in books makes this hard to do, without a too serious reading of game material. (Yeap, I said too serious, I'm a nerd, give me some slack, Jack)

That being said, in comparison to the forces out there, in history and in modern times, they are more than capable of making those comparison. The strategic goals as well as tactical operations of these forces are reasonable and don't face the issues of other fictional settings. However to try and specifically define these, requires documents Spartan may simply never produce. The same is true of drawing any sort of general outline of what is and is not the case. There are options out there that allow ships to not need a port or drydock for years. There are types of damage that require immediate and effective repairs just to maintain a watertight hull.

The same principle is true in space, though for different reasons.  At best you have a series of suppositions and assumptions. At absolutely best, I want to stress. At worst you have the ramblings and misreading of many different things, from someone who has a brain that has got something interesting going on in the wiring. What I can say with certainty is that the naval side of this is something complex, interesting and depending on the assumptions you make, it can be quite simple to explain. It can also involve math that makes the algebra you may have learned at school look like basic addition and subtraction.

To write or suggest doctrine is a complex task as you have a lot to think about. The implications don't end with a ship being built and crewed. It continues with how they fight, what they fight and when they fight. It defines so much that the moment you think doctrine has left the equation, you're going to get hammered for ignoring it.

 

 

Part 7 -

Historical accounts and examples.

Example 1 -

Battle of Jutland, WW1.

It's easy to misread this and get caught up in the anecdotes, comments of the time. The British did not have anything wrong with their ships. However, due to the relative size difference in the British empire of the time and the lesser German holdings, the British developed a need for speed that most didn't. Simply put, they had to have a way to get forces further, faster than anything the opposition have. Also, you can argue that the primary German threat was the British and it was much closer than the distances the British would need to cover. Ergo, if you don't need to more so far, you don't need the speed or endurance to get there.

This means for the trade off of having guns and speed, they could not have armour. Armour instead of speed, was the trade the Germans were able to make. They were able to resist a lot more firepower than the British could. This meant that while they lost, the overall tactical situation was that the British were able to react and maintain control of the surface of the ocean. Technology soon gave them control over under it, as well.

I would also point the extreme weakness of Mk 1 Eyeball (trust me, aiming by eyeball is a really bad idea) in long range gunnery. The further you're able to engage, the more information you need to be able to process to aim at the most likely spot, to get the best chance of hitting and damaging the enemy. I would also suggest that the idea that you can engage the enemy and not effectively damage them. Armour is always worth its weight, assuming the engagement is to be fought in a way where the armour is effective.

 

Example 2 -

Battle of Midway

The importance of intelligence is what I want to highlight here. The simple fact is that the Americans had the warning and were able to prepare. It's almost entirely unimportant what the Imperial Japanese Navy did. They were able to out thought and with little effort.

Perhaps the biggest lesson of this is that you do not provide the enemy confirmation of your actions. Assume the enemy knows more than they do. It's a better guess than they don't know your plans.

I would also point to the importance of the American training in damage control. It presented a major advantage over their rivals in the engagement. Training and rotations also ensured that knowledge of the enemy tactics was able to spread through the wider American military population. This means that everyone knew what they needed to do to beat the enemy.

 

Example 3 -

Battle of Leyte Gulf

Not for the reasons you might think. The first lesson I want to offer here is the control of local access ways can present tactical opportunities that would nullify what is the superweapon of the era. I would point to the actions of the battleships under Oldendorf. He had no carriers, only cruisers, small torpedo boats and battleships. While these had RADAR, they were far less important than the aircraft carriers.

The units of Taffy 3, notable for the number of aircraft it was able to put up and its efforts to resist the attack of the IJN forces show the importance of the carrier as part of a combined strike unit. It was not just one carrier targeting one ship, but of many carriers working in tandem to strike at the enemy.

I would also offer the nature of the IJN doctrine's failure to keep their carriers equipped with pilots and aircraft. That at the end of the day, it's not just a numbers game, it's also a game of flexibility. Instead of running down their pilot numbers in effectively nothing, America was able to keep an effective force despite the losses of skilled pilots it endured.

 

Example 4 -

Vietnam, USS Missouri

Obsolete technology is not necessarily useless technology either. The right technology in the right environment, engagement is more than capable of effective action. While I will be the first to say the Missouri was upgraded and refit on more than one occasion, she provided a capability to the US Navy and Marines that they needed in Vietnam.

This should help reinforce the idea of some flexibility in the doctrine you have. It's capability you need to build and support. The more you focus on one aspect, the more you can do with it, the more you can defend against it and the more weaknesses you inevitably build in.

 

Part 8 -

References -

Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition, Captain Wayne P Hughes, (Ret) USN. (Don't worry, I limited myself to a few academic volumes)

Achtung Panzer, Heinz Guderian (study of armoured operations, similar principles in terms of the depth of penetration over a width of penetration across a front, as practised by the French)

Battlefield series of documentaries, Discovery Channel, specifically Leyte Gulf, Midway.

 

Edited by LionofPerth
Lots of thoughts, lots of words, needed compression. Still does....... a lot of compression.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
On ‎8‎/‎18‎/‎2016 at 0:39 PM, Charistoph said:

Most, if not all, Mediums are classed as Capital Ships, aren't they?

yep, the only funky one is a defense platform, all mediums are capitals, but not all tier 2 ships are, defense platforms are small non- capital tier 2

 

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
On ‎8‎/‎18‎/‎2016 at 3:26 PM, Rocy7 said:

Now I try to describe the rules of creating the fleet, but I find lack the background, a some justification for the need to take into the fleet all particular classes of ships.

Are you ever wondered on this issue? Why fleet can not consist of only frigates, or only cruisers?

Its for game balance, nothing more.  In 1.0 or 1.5, fleets essentially consisted of T1s only; these rules forced you to bring T2 and T3 squadrons.  Further, if you look at any naval power, they have always tended to have a variety of ship sizes/classes.  Mostly this is because militaries generally don't discard something because it's outdated if it still has utility or value, so you end up with older, smaller ships and newer, larger ships.

Further, if you want to have a 'presence' in a lot of places at once, you're better off building several small ships instead of one big ship... especially when your small war ship is a bully compared to most ships.  Merchant vessels generally can't do much against a Frigate, so sometimes all you need is a Frigate to blockade a port.  No reason to waste a Dreadnought holding the blockade in this situation.  Save that for when the Cruisers show up to drive your Frigate away.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
Sign in to follow this  

×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

We have placed cookies on your device to help make this website better. You can adjust your cookie settings, otherwise we'll assume you're okay to continue.